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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arising under the False Claims Act 
involves a multi-billion dollar cancer drug, Avastin, which 
was developed by Appellee Genentech. Relator Gerasimos 
Petratos, who was head of healthcare data analytics for 
Genentech, filed a qui tam action soon after leaving the 
company. He alleged that Genentech suppressed data that 
caused doctors to certify incorrectly that Avastin was 
“reasonable and necessary” for certain at-risk Medicare 
patients. The District Court dismissed Petratos’s suit for 
failure to state a claim. Although we disagree with the District 
Court’s grounds for dismissal, we will affirm because 
Petratos failed to satisfy the False Claims Act’s materiality 
requirement.  
I 
A 
 A widely prescribed cancer drug that has accounted for 
$1.13 billion a year in Medicare reimbursements, Avastin is 
approved by the FDA to treat several types of cancer. Petratos 
alleged that Genentech concealed information about 
Avastin’s health risks. Specifically, he claimed the company 
ignored and suppressed data that would have shown that 
Avastin’s side effects for certain patients were more common 
and severe than reported. According to Petratos, such 
analyses would have required the company to file adverse-
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event reports with the FDA, and could have resulted in 
changes to Avastin’s FDA label. Genentech also allegedly 
suppressed information regarding Avastin’s side effects for 
patients with renal failure despite a request to disclose that 
information by a “Key Opinion Leader,” a recognized 
industry expert who “influence[s] peers’ medical practice, 
including but not limited to prescribing behavior.” John 
Mack, A KOL by Any Other Name, 14-03 Pharm. Mktg. News 
1, 1 (2015). 
Petratos claimed Genentech’s data suppression was 
part of a formal campaign, dubbed “Optimizing Data Value,” 
during which the company avoided certain analyses and data 
sets that might yield negative results to mitigate its “business 
risk.” App. 324–26. Petratos asserted that he tried to bring the 
safety risks inherent in this strategy to the attention of upper 
management, but was told “to stop any further work in [the] 
area,” App. 318, and had his job “threatened,” App. 314.  
As a consequence of Genentech’s data-suppression 
strategy, Petratos claimed the company caused physicians to 
submit Medicare claims that were not “reasonable and 
necessary.” In the opinion of one oncologist, if Genentech 
had properly disclosed Avastin’s side-effects for certain at-
risk patients, “the standard of care would have been to 
prescribe a lower dose of Avastin, a lower frequency of 
doses, or no dose at all.” App. 341.  
B 
Initially filed in 2011, this case was heard by three 
judges of the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. Soon before his retirement, Judge Cavanaugh 
dismissed Petratos’s initial complaint in part, but granted a 
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stay of the order so Petratos could amend his complaint. The 
case was reassigned to Judge Wigenton, who rejected 
Genentech’s argument that an amendment would be futile and 
held that Petratos “sufficiently alleged causes of action” 
under the False Claims Act. App. 56. Finally, the case was 
transferred to Judge Arleo, who took a different tack than 
Judge Wigenton and reasoned that “medically ‘reasonable 
and necessary’ is a determination made by the relevant 
agency, not individual doctors.” App. 16–17. Because 
Petratos’s theory relied on the doctors as part of the 
“reasonable and necessary” determination, Judge Arleo 
deemed the complaint fatally deficient and dismissed all 
claims. App. 18–19. Petratos filed this timely appeal.  
II 
The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Petratos’s federal claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. We “exercise plenary review of the District 
Court’s order granting appellees’ motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim.” United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United 
Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). We 
review for abuse of discretion both the District Court’s 
decision to reconsider a predecessor judge’s ruling, Fagan v. 
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1283, 1290 (3d. Cir. 1994), and its 
denial of leave to amend the complaint, United States ex rel. 
Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharms. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 
(3d Cir. 2014).  
 7 
 
III 
A 
Petratos’s claims implicate three interlocking federal 
schemes: the False Claims Act, Medicare reimbursement, and 
FDA approval. We begin by briefly outlining each scheme.  
The False Claims Act is meant “to reach all types of 
fraud . . . that might result in financial loss to the 
Government.” Cook Cty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 
538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003) (quoting United States v. Neifert-
White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968)). A False Claims Act 
violation occurs when a person “knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for 
payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). A claim is 
legally false when it does not comply “with a statute or 
regulation the compliance with which is a condition for 
Government payment.” Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 305.1 
The allegedly false claims in this case were submitted 
to the Medicare program, which reimburses the health care 
costs incurred by program beneficiaries. The Medicare statute 
provides that “no payment may be made” for items and 
services that “are not reasonable and necessary for the 
                                              
1 A claim may be factually or legally false. Wilkins, 
659 F.3d at 305. “A claim is factually false when the claimant 
misrepresents what goods or services that it provided to the 
Government.” Id. Although Petratos halfheartedly argues that 
the claims at issue are factually false, he is incorrect. There is 
no dispute that the physicians actually provided the claimed 
good (Avastin) in the claimed doses.  
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diagnosis and treatment of illness or injury.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A). Because a claim can be false if it does not 
comply with statutory conditions for payment, the claims at 
issue here are false if Avastin was not “reasonable and 
necessary.” See id.  
One important factor considered by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to determine whether 
a prescribed drug is “reasonable and necessary” is whether it 
has received FDA approval. Indeed, CMS guidance explains 
that “with some exceptions, a drug must have final marketing 
approval from the FDA to be considered ‘reasonable and 
necessary.’” Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, CMS Pub. 
100-2, ch. 1, § 30 (Part A). In most instances, the drug must 
also be used for a “medically accepted indication”—meaning 
that it has been deemed appropriate for the particular treated 
condition. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(t)(2). An indication is 
“medically appropriate” if it has been approved by the FDA 
or supported by research in certain authoritative compendia. 
See id.; 42 C.F.R. § 414.930. 
B 
A False Claims Act violation includes four elements: 
falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality. Universal 
Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1996 (2016) (materiality); Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 304–05 
(falsity, causation, knowledge). The District Court focused on 
the falsity element, concluding that the disputed claims were 
not false because they were “reasonable and necessary” as a 
matter of law.  
The District Court reached its conclusion by conflating 
two separate standards from the Medicare statute. First, the 
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Court noted that § 1395x provides that a drug is used for a 
“medically accepted indication” when it has been approved 
by the FDA or listed in authoritative compendia. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395x(t)(2)(A). It then adopted the rule from another 
district court case that this “medically accepted” standard is 
coterminous with the “reasonable and necessary” standard in 
§ 1395y(a)(1)(A). App. 14 (citing United States ex rel. 
Simpson v. Bayer Corp., 2013 WL 4710587, at *3 (D.N.J. 
Aug 30, 2013)). Consequently, the District Court held that 
because “Avastin is approved by the FDA and supported by 
compendia listings, . . . [Petratos cannot] argue that 
prescriptions [for] Avastin were not ‘reasonable and 
necessary.’” App. 14 (citations omitted) (second alteration in 
original). The Court explained that its decision aligns with the 
principle that “‘reasonable and necessary’ is a determination 
made by the relevant agency, not individual doctors.” App. 
17.  
 We disagree with the District Court’s reading of the 
statute. In our view, its analysis was premised on a false 
choice, namely, that “this dispute comes down to whether 
medically ‘reasonable and necessary’ is assessed by doctors 
individually or is defined by the regulatory scheme.” App. 16. 
But these two options do not account for all possibilities. As 
Petratos and the United States argue, a third possibility exists: 
that the “reasonable and necessary” determination is a process 
involving the FDA, CMS, and individual doctors. Indeed, 
CMS guidance, other Medicare provisions and regulations, 
and canons of statutory construction lead us to conclude that 
this is the best reading of the statute. 
First, CMS guidance makes clear that the “reasonable 
and necessary” determination does not end with FDA 
approval. The claim at issue must also be “reasonable and 
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necessary for [the] individual patient” based on “accepted 
standards of medical practice and the medical circumstances 
of the individual case.” Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, ch. 
15, § 50.4.3 (emphases added). The Manual provides 
examples of when a drug treatment could be approved by the 
FDA and used for a medically accepted indication, but still 
not be “reasonable and necessary.” For example, a drug 
treatment is not “‘reasonable and necessary’ for Medicare 
Part B if standard medical practice indicates that oral 
administration (as opposed to injection) ‘is effective and is an 
accepted or preferred method of administration,’ or if the 
administration of injections ‘exceed[s] the frequency or 
duration of injections indicated by accepted standards of 
medical practice.’” United States Br. 21 (quoting Medicare 
Benefit Policy Manual, ch. 15, § 50.4.3).   
Second, other Medicare provisions and regulations 
underscore the critical role of the physician in Medicare’s 
payment and reimbursement scheme. The regulations provide 
that “[t]he physician has a major role in determining 
utilization of health services furnished by providers. The 
physician decides upon admissions, orders tests, drugs, and 
treatments, and determines the length of stay.” 42 C.F.R. 
§ 424.10(a). Under Medicare Parts A and B, it usually is “a 
condition for Medicare payment that a physician certify the 
necessity of the services and, in some instances, recertify the 
continued need for those services.” Id. Indeed, physicians 
prescribing Avastin often must submit CMS Form 1500 along 
with a claim for reimbursement, wherein the doctor certifies 
that the drug was “medically necessary and personally 
furnished by me or . . . my employee under my direct 
supervision.” United States Br. 29–30 (quoting CMS Form 
1500). In addition, the Medicare statute contains a separate 
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section that outlines the obligations of physicians when 
providing services to plan beneficiaries, including the 
obligation to provide services “economically and only when, 
and to the extent, medically necessary.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-
5(a).  
Third, principles of statutory construction show that 
“medically accepted” and “reasonable and necessary” are not 
coterminous. “[T]he use of different words or terms within a 
statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a 
different meaning for those words.” Race Tires Am., Inc. v. 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 674 F.3d 158, 165 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(citation omitted). And once this erroneous premise is 
removed from the District Court’s decision, its analysis 
falters. See App. 14 (reasoning that because “the ‘reasonable 
and necessary’ standard [is] coterminous with the ‘medically 
accepted’ requirement, . . . [Petratos cannot concede that] 
Avastin is approved by the FDA and supported by compendia 
listings” and “still argue that prescriptions [for] Avastin were 
not reasonable and necessary”).  
The cases cited by the District Court do not hold that 
the “reasonable and necessary” decision is decided 
exclusively by federal agencies. Rather, these cases show that 
federal agencies retain ultimate control over the decision and 
that Government approval is a necessary component of the 
determination. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bodnar v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 903 F.2d 122, 125 (2d 
Cir. 1990). And none of the cited cases purports to eliminate 
the treating physician from the process. Indeed, other Courts 
of Appeals have recognized that “Congress intends the 
physician to be a key figure in determining what services are 
needed and consequently reimbursable.” Goodman v. 
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Sullivan, 891 F.2d 449, 450 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Rush v. 
Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 1980)).  
From a practical perspective, this multi-step 
interpretation makes sense. CMS and the FDA are best 
positioned to make high-level policy decisions— such as 
issuing national coverage determinations and drug approvals. 
These general approvals demarcate what treatments can be 
considered “reasonable and necessary,” and are thus a 
necessary condition for reimbursement. Meanwhile, the 
doctors are best suited to evaluate each patient and determine 
whether a treatment is “reasonable and necessary for [that] 
individual patient.” See Medicare Benefit Policy Manual, ch. 
15, § 50.4.3 (emphasis added). For example, Avastin is 
approved by the FDA to treat patients with metastatic 
colorectal cancer and such prescriptions are reimbursable by 
CMS. But if a doctor determined that a colorectal cancer 
patient had five hours to live and would best be treated with 
palliative care, then prescribing Avastin in that situation may 
not be “reasonable and necessary.”  
C 
Although we disagree with the District Court’s 
reasoning, we may affirm its judgment on any ground 
supported by the record. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Lady Jane 
Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983). Our 
review of the record leads us to conclude that Petratos cannot 
establish materiality, which the False Claims Act defines as 
“having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of 
influencing, the payment or receipt of money.” 31 U.S.C. 
§ 3729(b)(4). 
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Just last year in Universal Health Services v. United 
States ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court confirmed that “[a] 
misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, 
regulatory, or contractual requirement must be material to the 
Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable 
under the False Claims Act.” 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016). 
The Court described this standard as “demanding” and 
“rigorous,” id. at 2002–03, and explained that a material 
misrepresentation is one that goes “to the very essence of the 
bargain,” id at 2003 n.5 (citations omitted). This requirement 
helps ensure that the False Claims Act does not become “an 
all-purpose antifraud statute or a vehicle for punishing 
garden-variety breaches of contract.” Id. at 2003 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  
The Supreme Court also provided guidance as to how 
the materiality requirement should be enforced. It explained 
that a misrepresentation is not material “merely because the 
Government designates compliance with a particular 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement as a 
condition of payment . . . [or because] the Government would 
have the option to decline to pay if it knew of the defendant’s 
noncompliance.” Id. Materiality may be found where “the 
Government consistently refuses to pay claims in the mine 
run of cases based on noncompliance with the particular 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement.” Id. On the 
other hand, it is “very strong evidence” that a requirement is 
not material “if the Government pays a particular claim in full 
despite its actual knowledge that certain requirements were 
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violated.” Id. Finally, materiality “cannot be found where 
noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.” Id.2  
Petratos’s allegations do not meet this high standard. 
As the District Court noted: “there are no factual allegations 
showing that CMS would not have reimbursed these claims 
had these [alleged reporting] deficiencies been cured.” App. 
18. Petratos does not dispute this finding, which dooms his 
case. Simply put, a misrepresentation is not “material to the 
Government’s payment decision,” when the relator concedes 
that the Government would have paid the claims with full 
knowledge of the alleged noncompliance. See Universal 
Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
we think that where a relator does not plead that knowledge 
of the violation could influence the Government’s decision to 
pay, the misrepresentation likely does not “have[] a natural 
tendency to influence . . . payment,” as required by the 
statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). At a minimum, this 
would be “very strong evidence” that the misrepresentation 
was not material. Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 2003.  
The Supreme Court’s guidance in Universal Health 
Services also militates against a finding of materiality. The 
mere fact that § 1395y is a condition of payment, without 
more, does not establish materiality. See id. In addition, 
Petratos not only fails to plead that CMS “consistently refuses 
to pay” claims like those alleged, see id., but essentially 
concedes that CMS would consistently reimburse these 
claims with full knowledge of the purported noncompliance. 
                                              
2 The Court also rejected the argument that materiality 
is “too fact intensive” to allow dismissal at the pleading stage, 
explaining that plaintiffs must “plead[] facts to support 
allegations of materiality.” Id. at 2004 n.6. 
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Nor has he cited to a single successful claim under § 1395y 
involving drugs prescribed for their on-label uses or a court 
decision upholding such a theory.  
Petratos’s allegations are much like the sort of “minor 
or insubstantial” noncompliance that the Supreme Court 
explained should not be litigated under the False Claims Act. 
See id. Petratos does not claim that Genentech’s safety-related 
reporting violated any statute or regulation. He acknowledges 
that the FDA would not “have acted differently had 
Genentech told the truth.” App. 64. And as we have 
explained, he does not dispute that CMS would reimburse 
these claims even with full knowledge of the alleged 
reporting deficiencies.  
In fact, Petratos admits that he disclosed “material, 
non-public evidence of Genentech’s campaign of 
misinformation” to the FDA and Department of Justice in 
2010 and 2011. App. 337. Since that time, the FDA has not 
merely continued its approval of Avastin for the at-risk 
populations that Petratos claims are adversely affected by the 
undisclosed data, but has added three more approved 
indications for the drug. Nor did the FDA initiate proceedings 
to enforce its adverse-event reporting rules or require 
Genentech to change Avastin’s FDA label, as Petratos claims 
may occur. And in those six years, the Department of Justice 
has taken no action against Genentech and declined to 
intervene in this suit. 
Since Petratos concedes that the expert agencies and 
government regulators have deemed these violations 
insubstantial (or at least would do so if made aware), we do 
not think it appropriate for a private citizen to enforce these 
regulations through the False Claims Act. See United States v. 
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Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(dismissing False Claims Act complaint on materiality 
grounds because “federal agencies in this case have already 
examined [the claims] multiple times over and concluded that 
neither administrative penalties nor termination was 
warranted” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
After all, the False Claims Act is not “a blunt instrument to 
enforce compliance with all . . .  regulations.” Wilkins, 659 
F.3d at 307 (citation omitted). 
Petratos’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 
First, he claims that materiality is established because “if 
physicians would have prescribed no or less Avastin, the 
Government would have paid less claims.” Reply Br. 4. In 
other words, Petratos argues that materiality can be 
established by proving that the alleged fraud was the “but for” 
cause of the submitted claim. Petratos’s argument conflates 
materiality with causation, a separate element of a False 
Claims Act cause of action. See Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 304–05. 
Collapsing the materiality analysis into a causation inquiry 
would render the materiality element “surplusage” and fail to 
“give effect . . . to every clause and word of [the] statute,” 
which we are loath to do. Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 
188, 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). And even the causation element cannot be 
met merely by showing “but for” causation. See United States 
ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1174 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (explaining that the false claim must be “integral 
to a causal chain leading to payment” (citations omitted)); 
United States Br. 27 (“The United States does not contend 
that a claim is necessarily false or fraudulent because an 
antecedent fraud was a “but for” cause of the claim being 
submitted.”); cf. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 
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1720 (2014) (“Proximate cause is a standard aspect of 
causation in . . . the law of torts”). If a “but for” causation 
theory is insufficient to meet the causation element—where 
that type of proof is more properly directed—it follows that it 
should be insufficient to demonstrate materiality.   
 Petratos next argues that it is incorrect to focus our 
materiality inquiry on the Government’s payment decision. 
Rather, he claims that “the relevant question is whether 
Genentech’s fraudulent misrepresentations were material to 
the physicians’ determinations.” Reply Br. at 13. Petratos 
points to Universal Health Services, where the Supreme 
Court quoted a treatise to explain that “materiality ‘look[s] to 
the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the recipient of 
the alleged misrepresentation.’” Universal Health Servs., 136 
S. Ct. at 2002 (quoting 26 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts 
§ 69:12, p. 549 (4th ed. 2003)). Petratos reads this language to 
mean that in indirect-causation cases—where the fraud is first 
directed at an intermediary who then unwittingly forwards it 
to the Government for payment—we look solely to the initial 
recipient of the misrepresentation and not to the Government.  
We disagree. The full context of the quotation shows 
that when the Court wrote “the recipient of the alleged 
misrepresentation,” it was referring to the Government, not 
the initial recipient. See id. This makes sense because the 
Government will always be the recipient of the 
misrepresentation in the False Claims Act context. See 
Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 304–05 (explaining that a plaintiff must 
prove that “the defendant presented or caused to be presented 
to an agent of the United States a claim for payment” 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Indeed, when the Court 
turned to materiality in the False Claims Act–specific context, 
it exclusively referred to the Government as the ultimate 
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recipient of the misrepresentation. Universal Health Servs., 
136 S. Ct. at 1996 (“A misrepresentation about compliance 
with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must 
be material to the Government’s payment decision in order to 
be actionable under the False Claims Act.” (emphasis 
added)). 
Our sister courts have interpreted Universal Health 
Services the same way. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Garzione v. PAE Gov't Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 6518539, at *1 
(4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2016) (“The relevant question is whether the 
defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the 
defendant knows is material to the government’s decision to 
pay a claim.”); United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal 
Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2016) (“In 
order for False Claims Liability to attach, these misleading 
omissions must be material to the government’s decision to 
pay the claim.”); United States v. Sanford–Brown, Ltd., 840 
F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (dismissing claim where there 
was “no evidence that the government’s decision to pay [the 
claim] would likely or actually have been different had it 
known of [the violation]”). Besides, it would make little 
practical sense to give the doctors’ materiality determinations 
dispositive weight. Because the False Claims Act was passed 
to protect the federal treasury, United States v. McNinch, 356 
U.S. 595, 599 (1958), and since the Government decides on 
payment, Universal Health Servs., 136 S. Ct. at 1996, it is the 
Government’s materiality decision that ultimately matters.  
By attempting to focus our inquiry solely on the 
physician’s materiality determination, Petratos again tries to 
pass off restyled causation arguments as proof of materiality. 
The alleged fraud’s effect on physicians is relevant to the 
extent that it caused claims eventually to reach CMS. That is, 
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evidence of how the claim makes its way to the government 
should be considered under the causation analysis, while the 
materiality analysis begins after a claim has been submitted. 
The materiality inquiry, in asking whether the government’s 
payment decision is affected, assumes that the claim has in 
fact reached the government. See Universal Health Servs., 
136 S. Ct. at 1996. 
 The Supreme Court’s treatment of indirect-causation 
cases confirms this result. In United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess, the defendant contractors submitted fraudulent bids to 
local governments for various projects funded by the federal 
government. 317 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1943). Even though the 
fraud was not directed at the federal government in the first 
instance, the Court held the defendants liable because their 
“fraud did not spend itself with the execution of the contract,” 
but rather “taint[ed]” the claims paid by the United States. Id. 
at 543–44. In other words, if the fraud had deceived only the 
initial recipients (and not the government), then the 
defendants would not have been liable under the False Claims 
Act. Therefore, the alleged fraud must affect the United 
States’ payment decision to be actionable. Following this 
logic, our focus here should not be whether the alleged fraud 
deceived the prescribing physicians, but rather whether it 
affected CMS’s payment decision. Because it did not, 
Petratos’s claim fails.3 
                                              
3 Having reached this conclusion, it follows that 
Petratos’s two related claims also fail. Petratos’s state law 
claims are, as he notes, dependent on the viability of his FCA 
claim. See Petratos Br. 54 (arguing that because “dismissal of 
the FCA claims was in error, the dismissal of the other claims 
should be reversed.”). The same is true for his “reverse” FCA 
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 In holding that Petratos did not sufficiently plead 
materiality, we now join the many other federal courts that 
have recognized the heightened materiality standard after 
Universal Health Services. See, e.g., United States ex rel. 
Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 2017 WL 117154, at *6–7 (9th Cir. Jan. 
12, 2017); Sanford-Brown, 840 F.3d at 447; City of Chicago 
v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 2016 WL 5477522, at *15 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 29, 2016); United States ex rel. Scharff v. Camelot 
Counseling, 2016 WL 5416494, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 
2016); United States v. N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 
F. Supp. 3d 276, 295–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); Knudsen v. Sprint 
Commc’ns Co., 2016 WL 4548924, at *12–13 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 1, 2016); cf. Escobar, 842 F.3d at 111 (finding FCA 
violations material where those violations were “as central to 
the bargain as the United States ordering and paying for a 
shipment of guns, only to later discover that the guns were 
incapable of firing”).  
IV 
 We turn next to what is essentially a procedural 
challenge. Petratos claims that Judge Arleo erred by granting 
Genentech’s motion to dismiss in light of Judge Wigenton’s 
earlier finding that Petratos had “sufficiently alleged causes 
of action.” App. 56. He alleges that Judge Arleo did not 
                                                                                                     
claims. A reverse false claim occurs when a defendant acts 
improperly to avoid paying an “obligation” owed to the 
government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). But Genentech did 
not violate the FCA and, as the District Court noted, Petratos 
“provides no other basis for reverse false claims liability.” 
App. 21.  
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satisfy our rule that absent “‘exceptional circumstances,’ 
‘judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same court 
and in the same case should not overrule the decisions of each 
other.’” Petratos Br. 22 (quoting Hayman Cash Register Co. 
v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 1982) (citation 
omitted)).  
 Though Petratos does not cite it by name in his 
opening brief, he invokes the “law of the case” doctrine: a 
judicial rule of practice meant to “maintain consistency and 
avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the 
course of a single continuing lawsuit.” 18 Charles A. Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478 
(2d ed.). The law of the case doctrine is unhelpful to Petratos 
because it “does not limit the power of trial judges to 
reconsider their [own] prior decisions.” Williams v. Runyon, 
130 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, “[i]nterlocutory 
orders . . . remain open to trial court reconsideration, and do 
not constitute the law of the case.” Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-
Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1994). And the grant of a 
leave to amend is an interlocutory order. Powers v. Southland 
Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 1993). Therefore, Judge 
Wigenton’s order granting leave to amend was not the law of 
the case—and Judge Arleo was within her discretion to 
disagree with it.  
That this case was transferred between judges does not 
change the result. Although the doctrine provides that “a 
successor judge should not lightly overturn decisions of [her] 
predecessors in a given case,” “it does not limit the power of 
trial judges from reconsidering issues previously decided by a 
predecessor judge from the same court.” Fagan, 22 F.3d at 
1290; see also Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 
1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the “law of the case 
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doctrine has no bearing on the revisiting of interlocutory 
orders, even when a case has been reassigned from one judge 
to another”). 
V 
Finally, Petratos argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion because it denied his request for leave to amend 
without explanation. But there was nothing to explain. 
Petratos offered no reason why leave to amend was 
appropriate or what his amendment would have looked like. 
His cursory request for leave was contained in the final clause 
of his brief opposing Genentech’s motion to dismiss. See 
App. 99 (“Relator respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Genentech’s motion in its entirety or, alternatively, that 
Relator be granted leave to amend.”). This threadbare recital 
was insufficient. “While Federal Rule 15(a) provides that 
leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires, 
a mere request in [a brief in] opposition to a motion to 
dismiss—without any indication of the particular grounds on 
which amendment is sought—does not constitute a motion 
within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” U.S. ex rel. Williams 
v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 389 F.3d 1251, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (citation omitted). Because Petratos did not properly 
seek leave to amend in the District Court, we will not 
consider this argument on appeal.  
*  *  * 
Petratos’s allegations may be true and his concerns 
may be well founded—but a False Claims Act suit is not the 
appropriate way to address them. He concedes that Genentech 
followed all pertinent statutes and regulations. If those laws 
and regulations are inadequate to protect patients, it falls to 
 23 
 
the other branches of government to reform them. We will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
